The Effect Of Debt Choice On Firm Value by Hong, Soonwook
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2017 Volume 33, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 135 The Clute Institute 
The Effect Of Debt Choice On Firm Value 





This study aims to verify the effects of different methods of debt financing on firm value. The most common methods 
used by firms to finance its operations are directly issuing corporate bonds in the capital market and borrowing 
through financial institutions such as banks. From the accounting perspective, there is no difference between 
corporate bonds and bank loans. However, from the economic perspective, corporate bonds and bank loans are 
different in terms of their characteristics. This study conducts with the assumption that the attributes of the type of 
debt selected determine its impact on firm value. The results indicate that firms that use corporate bonds more 
frequently than bank loans have a higher value.  
 





irm value is determined by numerous complex factors. Since Ball & Brown (1968), numerous 
researchers have conducted studies on the capital market. Most of these studies focus on comparing 
the value relevance of accounting figures with share prices. The evaluation of firm value becomes an 
issue when deciding which information has value relevance. Ohlson (1995) investigated firm value using the 
information of book value of net assets and net earnings from the numerous accounting figures of a firm. However, 
subsequent researchers have argued that considering other information that reflects a firm’s characteristics could not 
only explain the firm value better, but also intensify the usefulness of Ohlson (1995)’s model (Kwon et al. 2010; Kim, 
2005). 
 
Capital structure is the representative accounting figure that influences firm value. Since Modigliani & Miller (1958), 
a lot of studies related to capital structure have been conducted in the fields of accounting as well as finance. 
Traditional theories on the determinants of capital structure, such as pecking order theory, trade-off theory, and market 
timing theory have focused on equity capital and debt capital. However, this study is conducted with the assumption 
that firm value could differ based on the selected method of financing that is, issuing corporate bonds or borrowing 
from financial institutions. Prior literatures have verified the various effects that arise from the type of debt being 
selected. Most of prior studies have focused on verifying the differences in firms’ earnings management and 
conservatism depending on the choice of debt. 
 
Information asymmetry exists between firms and investors. The information asymmetry between corporate bond 
investors and firms is larger than that between banks and firms. Information intermediaries such as credit rating 
agencies exist in order to reduce this asymmetry between corporate bond investors and firms. The accounting 
characteristics of corporate bonds and bank loans, which could be found in financial statements, are identical, but their 
characteristics are different from the standpoint of economics. As such, this study attempts to verify how the different 




According to Bhattacharya & Chiesa (1995), private debt investors have greater access to a firm’s internal information 
than public debt investors, as they are provided with its credit condition and investment plans during loan appraisal. 
Bharath et al. (2008) argued that private debt investors have higher monitoring efficiency than public debt investors. 
According to them, the agency problem could easily arise when firms issue public debts, but the possibility of bearing 
agency costs due to information asymmetry is relatively lower when firms issue private debts. Berlin & Loeys (1988), 
Blackwell & Kidwell (1988) argued that the information cost of corporate bonds is higher than that of bank loans. 
F 
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Kim & Bae (2006) investigated the relationship between firm’s characteristics, such as debt ratio and loan ratio, and 
conservatism. The results indicate that the inclination towards conservatism becomes stronger as the debt ratio 
increases and the loan ratio decreases. Haw et al. (2014) argued the effect of public debt on conservatism is stronger 
than that of private debt. On the other hand, Hong (2016b) directly compared and analyzed the relationship between 
corporate bond balance and loan balance from financial statements and the results suggested that firms with larger 
loan balance than corporate bond balance conduct conservative accounting operations. 
 
Chun et al. (2011) compared the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firms that have a high private debt ratio 
with those that have a high public debt ratio. They argued that the former conduct more earnings management than 
the latter. Financial institutions, the creditors of private debts, can easily obtain information about a firm, the debtor, 
monitor its business, and take control by modifying terms and conditions of the contract, thereby reducing any 
uncertainty. Hence, private debt investors would incur a relatively lower agency cost that arises from information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, public debt investors cannot easily obtain information about firms, monitor its business, 
and alter the terms and conditions of the contract. Therefore, they would incur a higher agency cost that arises from 
information asymmetry. Information intermediaries such as credit rating agencies aim to resolve the problem of 
information asymmetry faced by public debt investors. Credit rating agencies usually calculate the firm’s credit rating 
based on its financial information. (Black, 1975; Yoon & Park, 1999)  
 
However, Hong (2016c) concluded that firms that usually use corporate bonds conduct more upward earnings 
management than firms that usually uses loans. Kim (2010) investigated the value relevance between debt 
characteristics and book value of net assets and net earnings. Park (2013) stated that the characteristics of debt 
influence audit fees and Jung & Lee (2014) argued that the characteristics of debt influence the firm’s future earnings 
response coefficient. Hong (2016a) reported in detail the presence of differences in terms of earnings management, 
conservatism, and business performance evaluation between firms that issue corporate bonds through open 
competitive bidding and firms that do not. 
 
The preceding literatures indicate that firms’ accounting and financial characteristics differ depending on types of debt 
being used. Even though the results differ among researchers, it is clear that types of debt being selected have a 
differential impact on firms. This study establishes and verifies this hypothesis. 
 





The samples used in this study include firms that close their books in December and are listed on the Korea Exchange 
(KOSPI) from 1990 to 2015. Financial firms, which have different accounting standards, are excluded from the 
analysis. The data is collected from the databases provided by the TS-2000 of Korea Listed Companies Association 
and the DataGuide of FnGuide. The extreme values, the upper and lower 1%, are adjusted through winsorization and 
the total samples used in the final analysis comprise 9,209 firm · year.  
 
In order to analyze the effect of debt choice on firm value, the model of this study is established through equation (1) 
below. The market-to-book ratio (MTB) and Tobin’s Q, which are usually used as proxies for firm value, are chosen 
as the dependent variables and LOAN, which refers to firms that use more loans than corporate bonds, is chosen as the 
main variable. The variables that are known to influence firm value are chosen as the control variables. SIZE is 
included to control firm size effect, LEV is included to control financial soundness, OCF and ROA are included to 
control profitability, BETA is included to control risk, and GW is included to control growth opportunities.  
 
For robust analysis, the following three types of variables are used in the analysis: LOAN_D, the dummy variable that 
equals 1 if loans are larger than corporate bonds and 0 otherwise; LOAN_G, the continuous variable that indicates the 
value obtained by subtracting corporate bonds from loans; and LOAN_R, the loan ratio.  
 
MTBt (or Tobin’s Qt) = β0 + β1LOAN_Dt (or LOAN_Gt or LOAN_Rt) + β2SIZEt + β3LEVt + 
β4OCFt + β5BETAt + β6GWt + β7ROAt + ΣYD + ΣIND + εt (1) 
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MTB =  market to book ratio = market value of equity / book value of equity 
Tobin’s Q =  (market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of total asset 
LOAN_D =  1 if loan is bigger than bond, otherwise 0 
LOAN_G =  loan – bond, scaled by beginning total asset 
LOAN_R =  loan / (loan + bond) 
SIZE =  the natural logarithm of the total asset 
LEV =  leverage = total debt / total asset 
OCF =  cash flows from operating scaled by beginning total asset 
BETA =  3 year systematic risk measured by market model 
GW = sales growth rate 
ROA =  net income scaled by beginning total asset 
YD =  year dummy variables 
IND =  industry dummy variables 






Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Median Min Max 
MTB 9,209 1.082 0.867 0.869 0.142 5.423 
Tobin’s Q 9,209 1.006 0.348 0.952 0.446 2.505 
LOAN_D 9,209 0.569 0.495 1.000 0.000 1.000 
LOAN_G 9,209 -0.004 0.120 0.005 -0.340 0.382 
LOAN_R 9,209 0.603 0.386 0.625 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 9,209 26.457 1.532 26.194 23.710 30.838 
LEV 9,209 0.545 0.184 0.554 0.125 0.935 
OCF 9,209 0.050 0.084 0.048 -0.198 0.298 
BETA 9,209 0.892 0.476 0.865 -0.214 2.272 
GW 9,209 0.078 0.200 0.056 -0.544 0.930 
ROA 9,209 0.025 0.066 0.024 -0.250 0.205 
(1) Refer to ‘THE MODEL (1)’ for the definition of variables. 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the total samples. The average of the MTB and Tobin’s Q, the proxies 
for firm value, is slightly higher than 1. The average of LOAN_D is higher than 0.5, which indicates that firms use 
more loans than corporate bonds. Meanwhile, the values of other control variables are not significantly different from 
the values derived in the preceding literatures. 
 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables MTB Tobin’s Q LOAN_D LOAN_G LOAN_R SIZE LEV OCF BETA GW ROA 
MTB 1.000           
Tobin’s Q 0.899*** 1.000          
LOAN_D -0.073*** -0.100*** 1.000         
LOAN_G -0.053*** -0.077*** 0.728*** 1.000        
LOAN_R -0.088*** -0.115*** 0.912*** 0.744*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.012 0.051*** -0.265*** -0.180*** -0.292*** 1.000      
LEV 0.154*** 0.113*** -0.194*** -0.038*** -0.221*** 0.049*** 1.000     
OCF 0.049*** 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.085*** 0.103*** -0.190*** 1.000    
BETA 0.030*** 0.039*** -0.047*** -0.003 -0.051*** 0.223*** 0.089*** -0.067*** 1.000   
GW 0.129*** 0.144*** 0.001 -0.014 0.005 -0.013 0.100*** 0.113*** -0.027*** 1.000  
ROA 0.088*** 0.127*** 0.046*** -0.010 0.062*** 0.091*** -0.379*** 0.432*** -0.097*** 0.259*** 1.000 
(1) Refer to ‘THE MODEL (1)’ for the definition of variables. 
(2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 illustrates the correlations among the variables. As expected, the MTB has a very strong positive correlation 
with Tobin’s Q and LOAN_D, LOAN_G, and LOAN_R have strong positive correlations among themselves. It also 
illustrates that firm value has a negative correlation with the three LOAN variables. 
 
 
Table 3. Univariate analysis 
Variables LOAN_D = 1 LOAN_D = 0 Difference t-value 
MTB 1.027 1.155 0.128 6.98*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.976 1.046 0.070 9.67*** 
(1) Refer to ‘THE MODEL (1)’ for the definition of variables. 
(2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 illustrates the results of the univariate analysis that compares the value of firms that use more loans with firms 
that use more corporate bonds. The results from both proxies of firm value indicate that firms that use more corporate 
bonds have a higher value. 
 
Panel A and Panel D in Table 4 show that the regression analysis using the dummy variable LOAN_D as the main 
variable supports the hypothesis. The regression analysis that uses the MTB and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable 
indicates a significant negative value for every the LOAN_D coefficient. It indicates that firms that use more corporate 
bonds than loans have a higher value. Coefficients of control variables are not materially different from previous 
studies. 
 
Panel B and Panel E in Table 4 show that the regression analysis using the continuous variable LOAN_G as the main 
variable supports the hypothesis. The regression analysis that uses the MTB and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable 
indicates a significant negative value for every the LOAN_G coefficient. It indicates that firms that use more corporate 
bonds than loans have a higher value. 
 
Panel C and Panel F in Table 4 show that the regression analysis using the ratio variable LOAN_R as the main variable 
supports the hypothesis. The regression analysis that uses the MTB and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable indicates 
a significant negative value for every the LOAN_R coefficient. It indicates that firms that use more corporate bonds 
than loans have a higher value. 
 
Additionally, in every analysis, F-value is significant and variance inflation factor is low enough to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 4. Regression analysis 
Firm Valuet=β0+β1LOANt+β2SIZEt+β3LEVt+β4OCFt+β5BETAt+β6GWt+β7ROAt+ΣYD+ΣIND+εt (1) 
 
 Firm Value = MTB 
 Panel A 
LOAN = LOAN_D 
Panel B 
LOAN = LOAN_G 
Panel C 
LOAN = LOAN_R 
Variables Coeff. t value Coeff. t value Coeff. t value 
Intercept 1.958 10.71*** 1.781 10.22*** 2.130 11.42*** 
LOAN -0.089 -4.94*** -0.293 -4.12*** -0.154 -6.54*** 
SIZE -0.037 -5.66*** -0.033 -5.17*** -0.041 -6.29*** 
LEV 1.136 19.64*** 1.167 20.20*** 1.122 19.38*** 
OCF 0.437 3.94*** 0.432 3.89*** 0.453 4.09*** 
BETA 0.059 3.12*** 0.061 3.20*** 0.060 3.16*** 
GW 0.239 5.36*** 0.232 5.20*** 0.242 5.44*** 
ROA 2.072 13.24*** 2.068 13.21*** 2.085 13.33*** 
YD Included Included Included 
IND Included Included Included 
F value 50.42 50.22 50.90 
Adj. R2 0.205 0.204 0.206 
N 9,209 9,209 9,209 
 
 
 Firm Value = Tobin’s Q 
 Panel D 
LOAN = LOAN_D 
Panel E 
LOAN = LOAN_G 
Panel F 
LOAN = LOAN_R 
Variables Coeff. t value Coeff. t value Coeff. t value 
Intercept 1.248 17.32*** 1.128 16.41*** 1.331 18.11*** 
LOAN -0.057 -7.98*** -0.173 -6.16*** -0.090 -9.70*** 
SIZE -0.008 -2.99*** -0.005 -1.96** -0.010 -3.78*** 
LEV 0.366 16.06*** 0.386 16.91*** 0.359 15.74*** 
OCF 0.269 6.15*** 0.263 6.01*** 0.276 6.31*** 
BETA 0.023 3.08*** 0.024 3.20*** 0.024 3.15*** 
GW 0.128 7.29*** 0.124 7.03*** 0.130 7.40*** 
ROA 0.881 14.27*** 0.878 14.21*** 0.888 14.41*** 
YD Included Included Included 
IND Included Included Included 
F value 59.54 58.84 60.36 
Adj. R2 0.238 0.232 0.236 
N 9,209 9,209 9,209 
(1) Refer to ‘THE MODEL (1)’ for the definition of variables. 





This study conducted the analysis with the assumption that firm value can differ depending on the types of debt being 
selected. It went one step further from the debt ratio, which is the representative accounting figure and verified that 
the debt choice can influence firm value. The correlation, univariate, and regression analyses all indicated identical 
results, thus verifying that the value of firms that use more corporate bonds than loans is higher. This implies that the 
capital market’s evaluation is more favorable towards firms that use more corporate bonds than loans. Firm value as 
well as earnings management, conservatism, audit fee and future earnings response coefficient differ depending on 
the debt choice.  
 
The research conducted by Hong (2016b), who used a similar research design and samples to this study, posited that 
firms that use more corporate bonds conduct more upward earnings management and less conservative accounting 
operation as compared to firms that use more loans. The purpose of firms that conduct upward earnings management 
and non-conservative accounting operation is to obtain better evaluation in the capital market. If capital market 
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participants realize that firms have conducted upward earnings management and non-conservative accounting 
operation, firm value will be negatively impacted. However, considering this study’s empirical results, which indicate 
that firm value that use more corporate bonds is higher than that of firms that use more loans, implies that the capital 
market participants are not aware of upward earnings management and non-conservative accounting operations 
conducted by firms.  
 
This study is significant because it verifies that the type of debt selected is among the various factors that influence 
firm value. Therefore, firms should practice caution in selecting the type of debt. Moreover, investors and financial 
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